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How Financial Literacy and Impatience 
Shape Retirement Wealth and Investment Behaviors 
 
 
 
Research and policy interest is increasingly focused on the links between financial literacy 
and household saving, seeking to explain why consumers seem to undersave for retirement, take 
on too much debt, make poor mortgage decisions, and experience other problems in the modern 
financial environment.1 This paper explores two explanations for why consumers fail to optimize 
their financial decision making. One is that people suffer from financial illiteracy (Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2007a, b, 2008; Hastings and Tejada-Ashton 2008, Hastings et al., 2013; Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2014). This argument contends that many people lack the knowledge of key economic 
concepts and skills needed to make financial computations, which may cause them to make 
suboptimal financial decisions. It is this explanation that motivates the many policymakers who 
have recently launched campaigns to foster financial literacy around the world (OECD, nd; 
PACFL, 2008).   A second explanation is that people are impatient or “present-biased,” which 
implies that they chose current gratification over future, higher payoffs (Ashraf et al. 2006; Rabin 
and O’Donahue, 1999).    
While both explanations could be influential in explaining apparently suboptimal saving 
and investment patterns, thus far there is little evidence that either of these behavioral limitations 
is at the root of poor financial decision making.  This paper uses experimental evidence derived 
from the 2009 Chilean Encuesta de Protección Social (EPS or Social Protection Survey) to 
evaluate how financial literacy and impatience predict saving and investment decisions. The EPS 
                                                 
1 See for instance Duarte and Hastings (2010), Abaluck and Gruber (2011),  Ausubul (1991), Benartzi and Thaler 
(2001), Choi et al. (2010, 2011), Cronqvist and Thaler (2004);  Hilgert et al (2003); Kling et al. (2012); Lusardi and 
Mitchell (2008, 2009, 2017); Lusardi and Tufano (2015); Madrian and Shea (2001); Ponce Rodriguez (2008); and 
Sirri and Tufano (1998). 
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is similar to the US Health and Retirement Study, and it is a nationally representative panel of 
respondents followed every two years, fielded by the University of Chile’s Microdata Center in 
cooperation with the University of Pennsylvania (c.f. Arenas et al. 2008; Mitchell et al. 2008).2 
Chile is one of the most developed economies in Latin America, having levels of education and 
systems of credit similar to those of many developed countries. Also of interest is the fact that 
Chile converted to a mandatory national defined contribution system in 1981, giving all 
participating employees a chance to select a pension fund manager (AFP, or Pension Fund 
Administrator) from a small set of licensed portfolio managers.  Two aspects of the 2009 EPS are 
particularly valuable for the present paper. First, we administered a battery of financial literacy 
questions (developed by Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a, b) from which we develop a literacy index 
which can be used as a predictor of retirement saving and other key outcomes. Second, we designed 
and implemented a pair of experiments providing the opportunity to measure respondent 
impatience and respondent ability to carry out expressed intentions regarding financial behaviors, 
which we then link to outcomes of interest.  
Our results show that our measure of impatience is a strong predictor of retirement saving 
and investment in health. Financial literacy is also correlated with accumulated retirement saving 
though it appears to be a weaker predictor of sensitivity to framing in investment decisions. These 
results have implications for policymakers interested in enhancing retirement well-being through 
addressing shortcomings in behavior and economic decision making that may hinder planning, 
decision making and investments for long-run financial and physical health.  
 
 
                                                 
2 An earlier version of part of this discussion appears in Hastings, Mitchell, and Chyn (2011). 
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Data and Experimental Methodology 
The EPS is a nationally representative bi-annual microeconomic panel of Chileans, fielded 
by the University of Chile’s Microdata Center in cooperation with the University of Pennsylvania 
(Arenas et al. 2008; Bravo et al. 2004, 2006; Mitchell et al. 2008). The 2009 wave of the EPS 
collected survey data for a little over 14,000 respondents included in the ten-year panel. The survey 
is similar to the US Health and Retirement Study, and it delves into respondents’ labor history, 
health, retirement saving, and knowledge of and participation in Chile’s defined contribution old-
age saving scheme. In addition, the EPS also asks respondents to answer several questions 
measuring financial literacy and risk preferences (devised by Lusardi and Mitchell 2007a, b). 
These questions are as follows:   
1. Chance of Disease: If the chance of catching an illness is 10 percent, how many people out of 
1000 would get the illness? 
2. Lottery Division: If five people share winning lottery tickets and the total prize is two million 
Chilean pesos, how much would each receive? 
3. Numeracy in Investment Context: Assume that you have $100 in a savings account and the 
interest rate you earn on this money is 2 percent a year. If you keep this money in the account 
for five years, how much would you have after five years? Choose one: more than $102, exactly 
$102 or less than $102. 
4. Compound Interest: Assume that you have $200 in a savings account, and the interest rate that 
you earn on these savings is 10 percent a year. How much would you have in the account after 
2 years?  
5. Inflation: Assume that you have $100 in a savings account and the interest rate that you earn 
on these savings is 1 percent a year. Inflation is 2 percent a year. After one year, if you 
withdraw the money from the savings account you could buy more/less/the same? 
6. Risk Diversification: Buying shares in one company is less risky than buying shares from many 
different companies with the same money. True/False 
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We use the responses to these questions to generate a financial literacy index – the sum of correct 
responses to each question3 – which is our measure of an individual’s knowledge and capability 
of performing calculations needed to make wise financial decisions. 4  
To ascertain whether financial literacy affects how consumers understand financial 
terminology such as pension fund management fees and interest rates (following Hastings and 
Tejeda-Ashton, 2008), we provide information to individuals on pension investment returns net of 
fees, in various formats. Specifically, we present the pension fund menu in expected pension fund 
gains versus pension fund costs over a 10-year period, and we also vary whether these are 
presented in Chilean pesos or in Annual Percentage Rates. The formats were randomly assigned 
to EPS respondents, who were then asked to analyze the information and rank the funds on the 
menu as first, second, and third best, based on the information provided. We then use the financial 
literacy index discussed above to test whether the financially literate respondents are less strongly 
influenced by how the pension information is framed.  
In a second experiment we investigate whether people subject to impatience -- that is, those 
who overweight current consumption versus the future – are also those who make short-sighted 
investment decisions.  To test this hypothesis, at the end of the survey, each EPS participant was 
asked to play a “Game” to receive a gift card. In return for filling out a short shopping 
questionnaire, the interviewer gave each participant a gift card to be used at the largest grocery 
chain in the nation. If the respondent completed the short questionnaire right away (‘Now’), he 
would immediately receive a 5,000 peso gift card (about US$8); alternatively, he could elect to do 
                                                 
3 Behrman et al. (2012) explore alternative ways to construct a financial literacy index and report that more 
sophisticated measures perform about as well as the simple additive approach. 
4 Arenas et al. (2008) describes other EPS responses regarding knowledge of the Chilean retirement system 
including the mandatory contribution rate, the legal retirement age for women (60) and men (65), how pension 
benefits are computed in the defined contribution system, whether people are aware of the welfare benefit available 
under the law, and whether people know they may contribute additional funds to the Voluntary Pension system. 
Mitchell et al. (2008) focus on pension switching in the EPS.  
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so ‘Later’ – i.e., fill out the questionnaire and mail it back in a pre-paid, addressed envelope within 
four weeks – at which time the gift card is activated with a higher amount. This higher amount 
was randomized between 6,000-8,000 pesos in 500 peso increments, so respondents who delayed 
would receive a 20-60 percent return if they delayed receipt (by up to four weeks).5  The 
experiment permits us to identify three different types of respondents: the impatient who took the 
lower gift-card amount immediately, the efficacious deferrers who chose the later amount and 
returned the survey for the higher amount, and the inefficacious deferrers who opted for the later 
higher amount but then failed to send in the questionnaire so as to activate their cards.  This 
provides a real-world decision measure of ability to delay current gratification for future gains, as 
well as evidence on peoples’ ability to follow through on a plan with financial implications. Then 
we can determine whether respondents who choose Now at a cost of more money Later are also 
those who are unable to save for retirement and less likely to invest in their health.  
  
How Financial Literacy and Impatience Shape Retirement Wealth and Health 
In this section we explore how financial literacy and impatience are associated with 
retirement wealth and health. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the total number of financial 
literacy questions answered correctly, arrayed by respondent characteristics including age, sex, 
education, income, and whether the respondent indicated he had any saving.  On average, younger 
individuals and men were more likely to give correct answers to more of the financial literacy 
questions.  Similarly, financial literacy rises strongly with education levels, with those getting over 
                                                 
5Importantly, because the EPS is a longitudinal panel, all respondents have prior experience with the EPS interviewers, 
are regularly contacted by them for scheduling the interviews, receive a telephone number to easily contact the 
University of Chile’s Microdatos Center if they have questions, and will be recontacted to respond to future waves of 
the EPS. Accordingly, the level of trust between respondents and the EPS is very high, which minimizes uncertainty 
regarding receiving the higher but delayed gift card amount. 
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half of the questions correct being more likely to have completed at least their secondary schooling.  
Average monthly income was also strongly positively correlated with financial literacy, as was the 
propensity to have some form of saving and to be a member of an AFP pension plan (in the past, 
participation was optional for the self-employed and those not in formal sector jobs).  
Table 1 here 
 Next we focus only on AFP participants (self-identified) and investigate how respondents 
performed on specific financial literacy questions.  Table 2 shows that those who answered each 
question correctly were more likely than those who did not know the correct answers to have 
higher monthly income, more education, and saving.  Of particular interest is the Compound 
Interest question. It asked respondents to calculate the exact amount they would have in a saving 
account after two years if they started with $200 and the account paid 10 percent interest annually. 
Very few – only 154 respondents out of more than 8,000 asked the question – answered it correctly 
by giving a response of $242. This handful of respondents was substantially wealthier and more 
educated than the sample as a whole.  
Table 2 here 
 Results from the Game appear in Table 3. Overall, of the 8,850 participants in the game,6 
54% chose the Now option, with the remainder electing to turn it in Later for a higher value gift 
card. Of the latter, 17% failed to return the questionnaire, in effect losing the certain 5,000 pesos 
offered to begin with; 30% successfully returned the survey and received the higher Later amount.  
Column 1 of Table 4 reports odds ratios of characteristics influencing the likelihood that a 
respondent chose Now versus Later for completing the short additional questionnaire.  The odds 
of choosing Now decline with income, and the rate is lowest for those having the highest level of 
                                                 
6 We excluded participants who lived in remote rural areas and thus could not make use of the grocery gift card.  
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income (the excluded group is those earning 0). In addition, more educated respondents are much 
less likely to choose Now (the excluded education group is those with incomplete basic education).  
In fact, among those with post-secondary education at Technical or University levels, the odds of 
choosing Now decrease by about 40%. Married couples are also less likely to choose Now, 
conditioning on age. Interestingly a higher financial literacy score also decreases the odds of 
choosing Now instead of Later. The effect is small, with a one point increase in the score associated 
with a 2.8% decrease in the odds of choosing Now. However, it suggests that those who choose to 
defer payment for a greater reward are more likely to possess a basic understanding of simple math 
and financial concepts necessary to make intertemporal financial decisions. We also find that the 
probability of selecting Later rises as the amount offered increases, not surprisingly. It is 
unexpected that a sizable fraction of participants still chose the Now option when the Later choice 
would pay 8000 pesos.  
Table 3 here 
The second column of Table 4 shows the effect that these characteristics have on 
efficacious deferrals – that is, being able to return the completed questionnaire and receive the 
higher gift card amount, conditional on choosing to complete the survey later.  Interestingly, few 
of the sociodemographic variables predict this behavior, and the only strong and consistent factor 
refers to the respondent’s unemployment status: being jobless boosts the odds of returning the 
survey successfully by nearly 50%.   
Next, we seek to understand how these factors might influence saving and investment 
outcomes, and also whether they play a role in addition to the influence of income and education. 
Accordingly, Table 5 illustrates how these factors influence reported measures of retirement 
saving.  The first column presents odds ratios from a Logit model for self-reported participation in 
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the additional AFP voluntary saving program into which covered workers may contribute if they 
wish (above and beyond the required 10% contribution they are required to save in their mandatory 
AFP).   Interestingly, choosing the Now option in the Game is a significant predictor of whether 
the respondent says he contributes additional amounts to his personal pension account, and this 
estimate is in the expected direction: those who select Now have 25% lower odds of making 
voluntary contributions.  Higher paid workers are more likely to contribute, though more educated 
participants are not.  In addition, those with a higher financial literacy score are not more likely to 
pay in additional voluntary pension contributions, perhaps because they are saving in other 
vehicles.  
Table 4 here 
The second column of Table 5 provides Tobit estimates of self-reported savings regressed 
on the same set of variables.  Here we see that those who chose Now in the game also have less 
saving.7  Financial literacy is also significant and positive – those with higher financial literacy 
scores are more likely to have higher saving accumulations (confirming Behrman et al., 2012). 
Comparing the impact of financial literacy versus choosing Now versus Later, impatience in the 
Game lowers saving as much as a 2.5 point reduction in the financial literacy score. In other words, 
this provides support for the hypothesis that both financial literacy and short-run impatience play 
important roles in determining retirement saving, even after controlling for education and income.  
Next we explore other ways in which these two factors shape peoples’ long-term 
investment patterns.  Tables 6 and 7 examine the relationship between measured health 
investments and behaviors and EPS participant choices in the Game (health behaviors in the EPS 
are self-reported).  One set of outcomes is whether respondents had had any of several preventative 
                                                 
7 Future work can include more complete measures of saving such as home equity and business capital, and net out 
debt (as in Behrman et al., 2012). 
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exams in the past two years (since the last EPS round) including Pap smear, breast exam, prostate 
exam, and general physicals. The first four columns of Table 6 show that performance in the Game 
is a very strong predictor of having had preventative health exams for women. For them, people 
choosing Now are significantly less likely to have had Pap Smears and breast exams (odds fall by 
22-35%).  Interestingly, higher educated women are much more likely to have breast exams but 
not Pap Smears, and generally income is not a strong predictor of either exam (perhaps the latter 
can be explained by the fact that Chile has a national health insurance scheme making the coverage 
widely available). For men, the likelihood of having had a prostate exam is uncorrelated with Game 
behavior, though having had a general physical is.  Here those who chose Later and followed 
through were significantly more likely to have had a general physical than either those who chose 
Now or those who chose Later and did not follow through.   
Lastly, exercise can be viewed as a preventative health measure that imposes a cost now 
for health gains in the future. The EPS asks respondents approximately how often they exercise, 
with response options varying from never, to once or twice a month, to more than five times per 
week. We use this variable to construct a measure of weekly exercise habits to examine if we find 
a similar relationship between Game responses and health investments as we did with prior 
outcomes.  We do not find a significant relationship between self-reported exercise and- Game 
responses, even though the exercise measure is strongly influenced by education, age, marital 
status and sex with the signs and magnitudes one would expect. 
Tables 6 and 7 here 
Next we use respondent self-reported height and weight to construct a Body Mass Index to 
categorize each individual as underweight, normal weight, overweight, or obese. Results are 
provided in Table 7 for a Logit regression of whether the respondent is overweight or obese is 
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related to performance in the Game.  For women, demographic factors and the Investment Gain 
patterns are strongly associated with weight. Specifically, both those who chose Now and those 
who chose Later and followed through with their investment are significantly less likely to be 
overweight - by about 20% - compared to those who naively chose Later but then failed to get their 
questionnaire in on time. Little except marital status affects weight for men.  
For many people, then, behavior in the Game is related to successful outcomes in 
retirement saving accumulations, as well as in health behaviors and health investments. This 
suggests that the Game discriminates who is efficaciously patient – those who can make forward-
looking financial plans and follow through. We believe that identifying who has difficulty making 
such commitments may be important for increasing saving and investment behavior.  
 
Financial Literacy and Sensitivity to Information Framing  
We also undertook a separate experiment to further analyze how financial literacy might 
influence investment decisions. Since financial literacy is meant to measure the capacity and 
knowledge base necessary to perform calculations needed to make wise financial decisions, we 
hypothesize that financially illiterate individuals will be more sensitive to information and how 
financial information is framed. To examine this further, we provided individually-tailored account 
balance figures8 to respondents receiving the Gain version of the fee information worksheet used 
in the experiment.  To construct the Loss version of worksheets, we computed the difference 
between the largest 10-year account balance for each individual and each of the other four AFPs 
                                                 
8 Because some fund fees vary with contribution amounts, these valuations must be tailored to each respondent’s 
own particulars. We created each person’s estimated anticipated 10-year fund balances net of fees for all possible 
AFPs on offer by combining each respondent’s earnings from the 2006 EPS with historical returns and fees data for 
each fund manager. 
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in the menu. After fielding these experimental worksheets, we matched each respondent’s top three 
AFPs they would ‘recommend to a friend’ to our own ranking of the AFPs for that individual.  
Results appear in Table 8. Of the participants who received this information, 10 percent 
more respondents who saw the Gain sheet elected the lowest-cost AFP, versus those receiving the 
loss sheet (53 versus 48 percentage points).  In general, people were more responsive to rewards 
versus losses. Table 8 also indicates that the more educated, men, and the higher earners were more 
likely to elect the lowest-cost AFP, particularly when shown the Gain sheet.    
Table 8 here 
We further examine how information framing and other factors affect fund choice by 
testing for interaction effects of framing and literacy, so we can evaluate which population 
subgroups are most sensitive to information framing. Table 9 reports Logit odds ratios from 
analyses of whether respondents selected their lowest-cost AFPs, as a function of whether they 
received the Gain or Loss worksheet (controlling on other factors).  The first column pools results 
across respondents given AFP information as either a Gain or a Loss. Here we see that providing 
the Gain sheet is very powerful, boosting the odds of choosing the most profitable AFP by 26 
percentage points.  Quantitatively, showing participants a Gain worksheet has an impact as large 
as the impact of having a post-secondary education and twice as large as the impact of having 
above-median income. The measured effect is about the same as the impact of a one unit increase 
in the financial literacy index.  
Table 9 here 
 
In the second column, we add an interaction between financial literacy and how the 
information was framed. Now the odds ratio is significant and less than one, implying that a one-
unit increase in the financial literacy index reduces the impact of information framing by 
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approximately 10 percentage points.  Next, we add an interaction between framing and an indicator 
if the person chose Now in the Game. We do not find a significant impact, as expected. We would 
expect that choosing Now controlling for financial literacy should not have an impact on how fund 
information is interpreted across frames, but instead only affect measures of investments as we 
showed in the prior tables. It is also of interest to ask how framing interacts with both education 
and income.  When we add an interaction for having received a Gain sheet and having post-
secondary education, the odds ratio is significantly less than one for the interaction, and the 
interaction financial literacy and a Gain sheet becomes insignificant. Interestingly, the coefficient 
on the interaction between information framing and financial literacy is stable across the two 
specifications. This suggests that financial literacy scores and educational attainment are 
sufficiently uncorrelated to effectively test their separate influences on the ranking of AFP choices.  
Our results suggest that education is a stronger determinant of how sensitive respondents are to 
viewing information in Gains rather than Losses. Last, we add yet another interaction term testing 
for a joint effect of higher income and receiving a gains sheet. Here, the new interaction term is 
not statistically significant and the reported odds ratio is near one.    
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
This paper examines the roles of financial literacy and impatience on retirement saving and 
investment behavior, using new data we have generated using the Chilean EPS. We measure 
financial literacy as the ability to understand basic concepts like inflation, compounding, and 
investment returns, and we measure impatience using a game designed to elicit preferences for 
current gratification versus future gain and being able to follow through with it. We find that the 
impatience measure strongly predicts respondents’ self-reported retirement saving and health 
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investments. Financial literacy is also associated with more retirement saving, but it is less closely 
associated with sensitivity to framing of investment information.  In ongoing work, we are 
measuring the impact of impatience and financial literacy on actual saving, pension accumulations, 
and investment in health and health practices.  
Our results should interest policymakers seeking to determine how to better shape the 
environment in which individuals undertake saving and investment choices. Our results imply that 
it may be useful to facilitate decision making, particularly among the less-educated, as well as to 
facilitate people committing to and carrying out long-term financial decisions. As individuals are 
being asked to exert more control over their own retirement accounts (e.g., 401(k)’s) and other 
household investments, this raises a concern about whether consumers are capable of making 
optimal investment and saving decisions.  Further, the development of ever-more complex 
financial products makes it difficult for consumers to use these sensibly (Brown et al. 2017). What 
we have shown is that participant awareness of higher net-return funds can be greatly enhanced 
when information on fees is simplified in terms of likely gains from selecting higher net return 
funds. The impact of fund fee framing is largest for the least financially literate and the lowest-
educated groups. By contrast, choices made by the financially well-informed tend to be less 
responsive to the information presentation, since those individuals tend to better understand the 
financial concepts necessary to translate annual percentage rates into costs and benefits.  In the 
future, a field test of such policies would be the next step towards designing systems that level the 
playing field across socioeconomic groups and enable participants to commit to take actions now 
for greater gains later.   
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Table 1.  Financial Literacy and Other Sociodemographic Characteristics of EPS 
Respondents (2009) 
Number of Correct 
Financial Literacy 
Questions  
Age 
(Yrs) Male (%) 
More than 
Secondary 
Educ. (%) 
Avg. Monthly 
Income1 (CP $) 
Any Saving2 
(%) 
AFP 
Member 
(%) 
Obs. 
0 57 42 11 177,730 15 47 3,551 
1 51 44 0 212,408 20 65 2,788 
2 48 49 0 264,283 26 72 2,781 
3 46 52 40 349,340 28 79 2,588 
4 45 58 52 398,306 30 83 1,792 
5 45 62 64 557,379 36 85 675 
6 45 75 85 932,039 31 87 68 
Total 50 49 29 287,731 24 68 14,243 
Notes:  1Average monthly income calculation excludes those with zero income. 2Statistic created from Question D27 in the EPS. Interviewees 
have savings if they respond they have any of the following: (1) Savings for a Home (at a bank), (2) AVF Savings (Housing Fund Admin.), (3) 
Voluntary Pension Savings, (4) Account 2 AFP Savings, (5) Bank Savings Account, (6) Term Deposits, (7) Mutual Fund Investments, (8) 
Company Shares or Bonds, (9) Third Party Loans, (10) Other Savings (Cash, Dollars, “Polla”, etc.). 
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Table 2.  Financial Literacy Responses and Respondent Characteristics of AFP 
Participants 
 
Financial Literacy Question Age (Yrs) Male (%) 
More than 
Secondary 
Educ. (%) 
Avg. Monthly 
Income1 (CP $) 
Any Saving2 
(%) 
Chance of Disease 43 58 48 397,895 31 
Lottery 44 58 48 403,792 30 
Simple Interest 44 56 46 386,233 32 
Compound Interest 43 79 84 750,137 39 
Inflation 45 59 50 427,395 32 
Risk Diversification 44 56 43 377,870 31 
Notes: 1Average monthly income calculation excludes those with zero income. 2Statistic created from Question D27 in the EPS. Interviewees 
have savings if they respond they have any of the following: (1) Savings for a Home (at a bank), (2) AVF Savings (Housing Fund Admin.), 
(3) Voluntary Pension Savings, (4) Account 2 AFP Savings, (5) Bank Savings Account, (6) Term Deposits, (7) Mutual Fund Investments, (8) 
Company Shares or Bonds, (9) Third Party Loans, (10) Other Savings (Cash, Dollars, “Polla”, etc.). 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Game Decisions 
 
Offer Amount (CP $) Now (%) Later, No-Mail-in (%) Later, Mail-in (%) 
6,000 61.1 17.5 21.4 
6,500 58 16.1 25.9 
7,000 53.3 16.5 30.1 
7,500 51 16.7 32.3 
8,000 46.1 16.4 37.5 
Total 53.9 16.7 29.5 
Notes: Offer Amount is the amount offered to respondents for choosing to mail in their supplemental survey and 
receive compensation at a later date. Now is the decision to receive 5000 pesos at the time of survey rather than a 
higher amount later. Later, No-Mail-In are those who chose to receive more than 5000 pesos later but did not mail in 
the supplemental survey before the offer expired. Later, Mail-In chose to receive more than 5000 pesos later, mailed 
in the supplemental survey, and received this higher amount. 
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Table 4: Factors Affecting Game Decision-making 
  (1)  (2) 
  Now1  Later, Mailed In2 
  
Odds 
Ratio Std. Error  
Odds 
Ratio Std. Error 
Wage Quartile 13 0.925 (0.0714)  1.220 (0.148) 
Wage Quartile 2 0.879 (0.0743)  1.121 (0.144) 
Wage Quartile 3 0.907 (0.0771)  1.261* (0.162) 
Wage Quartile 4 0.780*** (0.0726)  0.822 (0.108) 
Age Quartile 24 0.984 (0.0639)  1.215** (0.117) 
Age Quartile 3 1.040 (0.0705)  1.122 (0.113) 
Age Quartile 4 1.115 (0.0884)  1.170 (0.143) 
Educ.-Basic Complete5 0.842 (0.155)  1.540 (0.463) 
Educ.-Basic Incomplete 0.835 (0.150)  1.594 (0.469) 
Educ.-Middle Complete 0.757 (0.139)  1.465 (0.439) 
Educ.-Middle Incomplete 0.780 (0.143)  1.750* (0.524) 
Educ.-Technical  0.617*** (0.114)  1.564 (0.469) 
Educ.-University Complete 0.598** (0.125)  1.582 (0.518) 
Educ.- University Incomplete 0.471*** (0.0971)  1.441 (0.464) 
Financial Literacy Score6 0.972* (0.0165)  0.980 (0.0247) 
Currently Unemployed7 1.005 (0.118)  1.487** (0.266) 
Fraction of time Unemployed8 1.003* (0.00139)  1.001 (0.00218) 
Male9 1.072 (0.0550)  0.926 (0.0719) 
Retired10 1.097 (0.107)  1.049 (0.165) 
Married11 0.860*** (0.0410)  0.930 (0.0677) 
Amount Offered  6500 pesos12 0.838** (0.0611)  1.274** (0.146) 
Amount Offered 7000 pesos 0.679*** (0.0491)  1.481*** (0.166) 
Amount Offered  7500 pesos 0.640*** (0.0463)  1.594*** (0.178) 
Amount Offered  8000 pesos 0.519*** (0.0376)  1.818*** (0.201) 
           
Observations 8095    3755   
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.536    0.64   
Notes: Estimates from logit regressions. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). 1Indicator for 
choosing to receive 5000 pesos at the time of survey rather than a higher amount later. 2Indicator for choosing to 
receive more than 5000 pesos later and mailing in the supplemental survey and receiving this higher amount; 
sample is limited to respondents who chose to receive the higher amount later. 3Dummy variables for wage quartile 
given the participant has a wage; respondents with no wage at the time of survey are given a wage quartile of 0 
and make up the omitted group. 4Dummy variables for age quartile. 5Dummy variables for highest education level 
attained. "Incomplete" means either that the schooling was not completed or that it is currently in progress. 
6Number of questions answered correctly out of a set of 6 questions designed to measure financial literacy. 
7Indicator for being currently unemployed at the time of survey. 8Fraction of time the respondent was unemployed 
between Jan 2006 and the time of survey. 9Indicator for whether the respondent is male. 10Indicator for whether 
the respondent is retired. 11Indicator for whether the respondent is married. 12Dummy variables for the amount 
offered to participants for choosing to mail in their supplemental survey and receive compensation at a later date. 
Dummy variables for each of the Big Five personality traits are also included in both specifications. These are 
indicator variables that take a value of 1 if the respondent scores more than a standard deviation above the mean 
for the trait. 
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Table 5: How Financial Literacy and Impatience Correlates with Any Voluntary Pension 
Saving and Total Saving 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  Voluntary Pension1  Total Savings2 
  Odds Ratio 
Std. 
Error  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
Now3 0.759* (0.124)  -7832*** (2765) 
Later, Mailed In4 1.088 (0.180)  -1215 (2951) 
Wage Quartile 15 2.983*** (1.157)  3111 (3507) 
Wage Quartile 2 5.572*** (2.048)  5227 (3757) 
Wage Quartile 3 6.938*** (2.482)  10901*** (3704) 
Wage Quartile 4 15.11*** (5.330)  13903*** (3965) 
Age Quartile 26 1.166 (0.186)  -7140*** (2709) 
Age Quartile 3 1.606*** (0.260)  -5276* (2867) 
Age Quartile 4 0.674 (0.191)  -17415*** (3649) 
Educ.-Basic Complete7 0.536 (0.574)  6963 (9629) 
Educ.-Basic Incomplete 0.587 (0.622)  2131 (9470) 
Educ.-Middle Complete 1.734 (1.785)  16019* (9542) 
Educ.-Middle Incomplete 1.115 (1.156)  3387 (9585) 
Educ.-Technical  1.824 (1.878)  14908 (9567) 
Educ.-University Complete 2.389 (2.490)  24911** (10251) 
Educ.- University Incomplete 2.189 (2.282)  13085 (10267) 
Financial Literacy Score8 1.035 (0.0460)  2929*** (736.7) 
Currently Unemployed 5.686*** (2.519)  631.4 (5165) 
Fraction of time Unemployed9 0.992* (0.00475)  -2.847 (60.18) 
Male 0.965 (0.130)  -3922* (2254) 
Retired  0.829 (0.663)  1459 (4948) 
Married 1.082 (0.143)  843.3 (2113) 
           
Observations 8095    7675   
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.037    897.429   
Notes: Estimates from a logit regression for having made voluntary pension contributions and a tobit regression 
for total savings. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01).  1Indicator for having made 
voluntary pension savings between Jan. 2006 and the time of survey. 2Total amount of savings and investments 
in 1000s of pesos.  3Indicator for choosing to receive 5000 pesos at the time of survey rather than a higher 
amount later. 4Indicator for choosing to receive more than 5000 pesos later and mailing in the supplemental 
survey and receiving this higher amount. 5Dummy variables for wage quartile given the participant has a wage; 
respondents with no wage at the time of survey make up the omitted group. 6Dummy variables for age quartile. 
7Dummy variables for highest education level attained. 8Number of questions answered correctly out of a set 
of 6 questions designed to measure financial literacy. 9Fraction of time the respondent was unemployed between 
Jan 2006 and the time of survey. Dummy variables for the amount offered to participants for choosing the Later 
option and dummy variables for scoring over a std. deviation above the mean for a Big Five personality trait 
are also included in all specifications. 
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Table 6:  How Game Behaviors Covary with Preventative Health Behaviors 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 Pap Smear1  Breast Examination2  Prostate Exam3  General Consultation4  Exercise5 
  
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. 
Error 
 Odds 
Ratio 
Std. 
Error 
 Odds 
Ratio 
Std.    
Error 
 Odds 
Ratio Std. Error 
 Odds 
Ratio 
Std. 
Error 
Now6 0.651*** (0.107)  0.783** (0.0782)  1.016 (0.153)  1.014 (0.0659)  0.948 (0.0786) 
Later, Mailed In7 0.814 (0.144)  0.961 (0.103)  0.950 (0.160)  1.164** (0.0819)  0.972 (0.0872) 
Wage Quartile 18 0.938 (0.171)  0.886 (0.0899)  0.589** (0.132)  0.846** (0.0655)  1.011 (0.110) 
Wage Quartile 2 0.656** (0.128)  1.150 (0.139)  0.653* (0.149)  0.769*** (0.0660)  0.944 (0.108) 
Wage Quartile 3 0.815 (0.166)  0.873 (0.115)  0.839 (0.181)  0.911 (0.0780)  0.878 (0.0987) 
Wage Quartile 4 1.092 (0.258)  0.916 (0.141)  1.731** (0.384)  0.860 (0.0804)  0.933 (0.109) 
Age Quartile 29 1.275 (0.217)  1.332*** (0.118)     1.059 (0.0703)  0.701*** (0.0568) 
Age Quartile 3    1.149 (0.108)  0.521*** (0.0680)  1.312*** (0.0903)  0.636*** (0.0553) 
Age Quartile 4    1.377 (0.353)     1.767*** (0.141)  0.555*** (0.0598) 
Educ.-Basic Complete10    2.633* (1.302)  0.917 (0.282)  1.061 (0.188)  3.519*** (1.513) 
Educ.-Basic Incomplete 0.898 (0.282)  2.146 (1.054)  0.675 (0.201)  1.075 (0.186)  2.865** (1.225) 
Educ.-Middle Complete 0.913 (0.220)  2.599* (1.272)  1.594 (0.509)  1.040 (0.184)  4.675*** (1.998) 
Educ.-Middle Incomplete 1.222 (0.344)  3.025** (1.486)  0.816 (0.256)  1.064 (0.188)  4.002*** (1.713) 
Educ.-Technical  1.096 (0.260)  2.937** (1.439)  1.099 (0.355)  1.119 (0.198)  5.281*** (2.257) 
Educ.-University Complete 0.823 (0.249)  3.087** (1.582)  2.631** (1.048)  1.191 (0.238)  8.210*** (3.599) 
Educ.- University Incomplete 0.824 (0.255)  2.889** (1.475)  1.954* (0.750)  1.403* (0.278)  7.441*** (3.255) 
Currently Unemployed 0.517** (0.133)  0.901 (0.153)  1.029 (0.317)  0.866 (0.102)  0.819 (0.126) 
Fraction of time Unemployed11 1.005 (0.00291)  1.001 (0.00192)  0.994 (0.0040)  1.000 (0.0014)  1.003* (0.0018) 
Male          0.527*** (0.0273)  2.287*** (0.155) 
Retired    4.050** (2.655)  1.499** (0.271)  1.213** (0.118)  0.880 (0.131) 
Married 1.647*** (0.209)  1.125 (0.0832)  1.588*** (0.200)  1.201*** (0.0580)  0.956 (0.0607) 
               
Observations 1312   3279   1714   8082   8095  
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.616   0.507   0.373   0.458    0.178  
Notes: Estimates from logit regressions.  Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01).  1Indicator for having had a Pap Smear in the last two years; sample limited to women 40 & under. 
2Indicator for practicing regular breast self-examination; sample limited to women 60 & under.  3Indicator for having had a prostate exam in the last two years; sample limited to men 50 & older. 4Indicator 
for having visited the doctor for a general consultation in the last two years.  5Indicator for exercising more than once a week. 6Indicator for choosing to receive 5000 pesos at the time of survey rather than 
a higher amount later. 7Indicator for choosing to receive more than 5000 pesos later and mailing in the supplemental survey and receiving this higher amount. 8Dummy variables for wage quartile given the 
participant has a wage; respondents with no wage at the time of survey make up the omitted group. 9Dummy variables for age quartile. 10Dummy variables for highest education level attained.11Fraction of 
time the respondent was unemployed between Jan 2006 and the time of survey. Dummy variables for the amount offered to participants for choosing the Later option and dummy variables for scoring over 
a std. deviation above the mean for a Big Five personality trait are also included in all specifications. 
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Table 7:  How Game Behavior Covaries with Overweight 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Overweight
1  Overweight - Males  Overweight - Females  
  
Odds 
Ratio Std. Error  Odds Ratio Std. Error  Odds Ratio Std. Error 
Now2 0.910 (0.0626)  1.018 (0.101)  0.800** (0.0783) 
Later, Mailed In3 0.901 (0.0671)  0.948 (0.102)  0.834* (0.0878) 
Wage Quartile 14 1.059 (0.0886)  1.326* (0.218)  1.098 (0.113) 
Wage Quartile 2 0.926 (0.0830)  1.117 (0.178)  1.081 (0.133) 
Wage Quartile 3 0.956 (0.0860)  1.256 (0.197)  0.821 (0.108) 
Wage Quartile 4 1.237** (0.122)  1.521** (0.249)  0.972 (0.148) 
Age Quartile 25 1.381*** (0.0936)  1.176 (0.121)  1.585*** (0.147) 
Age Quartile 3 1.508*** (0.108)  1.147 (0.124)  1.853*** (0.183) 
Age Quartile 4 1.354*** (0.114)  1.045 (0.132)  1.681*** (0.198) 
Educ.-Basic Complete6 0.944 (0.198)  1.059 (0.305)  0.816 (0.265) 
Educ.-Basic Incomplete 0.823 (0.168)  0.982 (0.278)  0.645 (0.204) 
Educ.-Middle Complete 0.706* (0.146)  1.291 (0.373)  0.368*** (0.117) 
Educ.-Middle Incomplete 0.780 (0.162)  1.006 (0.290)  0.539* (0.172) 
Educ.-Technical  0.719 (0.149)  1.270 (0.367)  0.402*** (0.128) 
Educ.-University Complete 0.469*** (0.107)  0.927 (0.294)  0.277*** (0.0968) 
Educ.- University Incomplete 0.524*** (0.119)  0.958 (0.300)  0.288*** (0.100) 
Currently Unemployed 0.887 (0.109)  1.046 (0.205)  0.949 (0.166) 
Fraction of time Unemployed7 1.000 (0.00144)  0.998 (0.00223)  1.000 (0.00198) 
Male 1.093* (0.0590)           
Retired  0.827* (0.0870)  1.100 (0.187)  0.780* (0.117) 
Married 1.392*** (0.0704)  1.639*** (0.126)  1.295*** (0.0913) 
         
Observations 7579    3620    3959   
Mean of Overweight 0.627    0.644    0.611   
Notes: Estimates from logit regressions. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). 1Indicator for a Body Mass Index (BMI) in the range 
classified as either overweight or obese; BMI is calculated from respondent reported weight and height. 2Indicator for choosing to receive 5000 pesos at the 
time of survey rather than a higher amount later. 3Indicator for choosing to receive more than 5000 pesos later and mailing in the supplemental survey and 
receiving this higher amount. 4Dummy variables for wage quartile given the participant has a wage; respondents with no wage at the time of survey make up 
the omitted group. 5Dummy variables for age quartile. 6Dummy variables for highest education level attained. 7Fraction of time the respondent was 
unemployed between Jan 2006 and the time of survey. Dummy variables for the amount offered to participants for choosing the Later option and dummy 
variables for scoring over a std. deviation above the mean for a Big Five personality trait are also included in all specifications. 
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Table 8. Factors Associated with Respondent Ranking Lowest-Cost AFP as Best 
(AFP Participants) 
 
Ranked 
Lowest-Cost 
AFP Best 
Saw 
Gains 
Sheet 
(%) 
Age 
(Yrs) 
Male 
(%) 
More than 
Secondary Educ. 
(%) 
Avg. Monthly 
Income1 (CP$) 
Any 
Savings2 
(%) 
Obs.3 
No 48 45 54 32 297,491  28 4,923 
Yes 53 46 54 41 371,975  29 3,691 
Total 50 45 54 36 329,873  28 8,614 
Notes: 1Average monthly income calculation excludes those with zero income. 2Statistic created from question D27 in the EPS. Interviewees 
have savings if they respond that they have any of the following: (1) Savings for a Home (at a bank), (2) AVF Savings (Housing Fund 
Admin.), (3) Voluntary Pension Savings, (4) Account 2 AFP Savings, (5) Bank Savings Account, (6) Term Deposits, (7) Mutual Fund 
Investments, (8) Company Shares or Bonds, (9) Third Party Loans, (10) Other Savings (Cash, Dollars, “Polla”, etc.). 3 Total is less than 
9,671 (all self-identified AFP holders) because some interviewees do not receive the experiment. 
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Table 9. Logit Analysis of Factors Associated with Respondent Ranking Lowest-Cost 
AFP as Best (Odds Ratios Reported) 
 
Dependent. Var: Respondent Ranked Lowest-Cost AFP Best    
Saw Gains Sheet  1.202*** 1.461*** 1.419*** 1.535*** 1.679*** 
 (0.076) (0.172) (0.192) (0.213) (0.251) 
Age 1.087*** 1.088*** 1.088*** 1.087*** 1.087*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age-squared 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Male 0.957 0.956 0.957 0.958 0.960 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Married 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.948 0.947 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
At least 1 type of Savings1 0.887* 0.883* 0.884* 0.881* 0.882* 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) 
Financial Literacy Score2 1.203*** 1.253*** 1.253*** 1.231*** 1.224*** 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Now3 0.925 0.925 0.900 0.911 0.909 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) 
>Secondary Schooling 1.255*** 1.256*** 1.256*** 1.503*** 1.466*** 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.148) (0.146) 
Above Median Income 1.145* 1.146* 1.147* 1.149* 1.285** 
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.129) 
Financial Literacy * Saw Gains Sheet  0.920** 0.921* 0.954 0.965   (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) 
Chose Now * Saw Gains Sheet   1.057 1.031 1.031    (0.134) (0.131) (0.131) 
>Secondary Schooling * Saw Gains Sheet    0.699*** 0.737** 
    (0.094) (0.102) 
Above Median Income * Saw Gains Sheet     0.801 
     (0.111) 
Observations4 4282 4282 4282 4282 4282 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). 1Indicator created from Question D27 in the 
EPS. Interviewees have savings if they respond they have any of the following: (1) Savings for a Home (at a bank), (2) AVF Savings (Housing 
Fund Admin.), (3) Voluntary Pension Savings, (4) Account 2 AFP Savings, (5) Bank Savings Account, (6) Term Deposits, (7) Mutual Fund 
Investments, (8) Company Shares or Bonds, (9) Third Party Loans, (10) Other Savings (Cash, Dollars, “Polla”, etc.). 2Number of questions 
answered correctly out of a set of 6 questions designed to measure financial literacy.  3Indicator for choosing to receive 5000 pesos at the time 
of survey rather than a higher amount later. 4Observations are only for individuals who have all demographic responses non-missing and are 
AFP members that received both experiments. 
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APPENDIX 
Example Sheets from Fee Framing Experiment 
 
Example 1: Fees framed as a loss versus the AFP with best net returns 
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Example 2: Fees framed as a gain in account value 
 
 
